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1. Introduction 
In October 1948 Burma (Myanmar) gained independence from Britain and ever since Burma 
has been embroiled in one of the longest running ethnic conflicts. The country has seen 
diverse ethnic uprisings, various transformations of the national government and a changing 
structure of conflict. Conflict resolution is a most essential primary need for the people of 
Myanmar if they want to achieve peace and a stable nation-state (Smith 2007).   
 
1.1 Historical background 
Upon independence the constitution was designed in such a manner that it provided special 
rights for different ethnic groups. The attempt to acknowledge the ethnic diverse Burmese 
population did not transcend into political loyalty for the new state. Similar to other newly 
independent South Asian states, the ethnic diversity and social uprisings fragmented Burma. 
In 1949 a revolt initiated by the Karen tribal group led the country in a civil war (Bercovitch 
and Fretter 2004: 167; Nyein 2009: 128).  In 1962, a coup d’état was staged by General Ne 
Win, his regime was relentless towards accommodating the political hopes of the various 
ethnic minorities and the fighting continued.        
 Social uprisings in 1988 changed the internal conflict once again, when General Ne 
Win's reign ended and the military regime led by Saw Maung took power. A new ruling 
council – the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) – was established. The 
military regime (later known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)) wanted to 
end the conflict and desired a ceasefire (Nyein 2009: 128). As such the regime started several 
negotiations with ethnic groups resulting in occasional cease-fires, yet the underlying political 
issues remained unresolved (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 167).   
 In 1990 multiparty elections were held, the National League for Democracy (NLD) 
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won with a landside; the NLD won 392 of the total 492 seats. However, the military regime 
refused to recognise the elections results and prevented the legislative assembly from 
convening. Moreover, the regime arrested members of the opposition, including the NLD 
leader, Aung San Suu Kyi who was put under house arrest. In 1991, Aung San Suu Kyi 
received the Nobel Peace Prize “for her non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights”  
(The Norwegian Nobel Institute 2014).  
 In 1995 the Karen National Unity (KNU) headquarter in Manerplaw was overtaken by 
the regime's troops, weakening the opposition. Bilateral negotiations between the Karen and 
the regime continued, yet no agreement was found. Armed conflicts continued and an 
estimated 140,000 people had lost their lives by the end of 1995 (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 
167; Nyein 2009: 128-129).  In 1997 failed peace negotiations led to the continuation of 
violence between the SLORC and the KNU.  
 
1.2 Main argument and outline 
After the 1990 elections, Myanmar has received attention from the international community. 
The United Nations (UN) has also been sending special envoys to find a peaceful and 
democratic outcome. Since 1995 four UN envoys have visited Myanmar on numerous visits. 
Currently, a quasi-civilian government headed by president Thein Sein controls the country 
and several reforms have been implemented. Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi has returned to the 
political arena after being under house arrest for 15 years.      
 The role of the UN in Myanmar has been widely discussed. To what extent did the 
envoys influence the current situation? Which mediation strategies did were adopted? This 
paper will research the UN mediation processes that have occurred between 1992 and 2013 in 
Myanmar. Furthermore, I will argue that the envoys have made a difference in the conflict. 
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However sanctions of UN member states against Myanmar have restricted the envoys during 
the  mediation process. These restrictions have limited the prospects of an agreement between 
the regime and the opposition for a long time.          
 The second chapter of this thesis outlines the theoretical framework describing several 
mediation theories. It elaborates on mediation process and strategies in the pre-mediation 
phase, the mediation phase and post mediation phase. The third chapter describes the research 
design and introduces the main research question. The fourth chapter describes UN mediation, 
the envoys and the responses of the military regime and Aung San Suu Kyi. Furthermore, the 
third chapter connects the theoretical framework with the empirical findings. In the 
conclusion the main arguments are summarised and the research question is answered. In 
addition, several other mediation efforts are described and recommendations are made to 
improve future UN mediation in Myanmar.  
 
1.3 Myanmar/Burma 
Subsequently, in 1989 the regime suppressed nationwide protests which killed thousands. The 
then ruling military regime decided to change its name from Burma to Myanmar. Several 
states such as the US and the UK did not recognise this name change since they also do not 
recognise the legitimacy of the military regime (The World Factbook 2014). Most other 
countries and the UN did accept the change and internationally both names are recognised. 
The democracy movement in Burma prefers the name 'Burma' and the military regime 
advocates the name 'Myanmar'.         
 It has been argued that using either Burma or Myanmar can be an indicator to 
someone's sympathies. The European Union uses Myanmar/Burma to indicate impartiality 
(Europeaid 2014). In addition, Burma and Myanmar have a similar definition and in the 19th 
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Century 'Burmah' was an informal alteration of the word 'Myanmar' (BBC 2014). The author 
of this thesis uses the name 'Myanmar' since this is the officially adopted name by the UN. 
However no indication of personal sympathies should be concluded from this choice.   
 
8 
 
2. Theoretical framework: Conflict mediation 
Conflict mediation is “a conflict-management method in which an outside party helps 
adversaries to solve their differences peacefully” (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 15). This 
outside party commonly has no further authority to enforce a peaceful outcome (Wall, Stark et 
al. 2001). Essential to the concept of mediation is the voluntary aspect for both the disputants 
and the mediator (Greig and Diehl 2012: 2).       
 In the period between 1918 and 1996 thirty percent of the crises worldwide were 
mediated by third parties (Fey and Ramsay 2010). Moreover, conflicts are six times more 
likely to come to a peaceful agreement when a third-party is present (Duursma 2014). Since 
mediation is a strategy often used in conflict, extensive research has been done to find the 
causes of successful or failing mediations. This theoretical framework is set out to explain 
three different stages in mediation: how does mediation come about (the preliminary phase), 
which strategies and approaches can be used during mediation and what are the outcomes of 
these strategies? 
 
2.1.Preliminary phase 
Acceptance of mediation 
First of all, Greig and Regan's (2008) research indicated the influence of the duration of a  
conflict and the disputants’ acceptance towards mediation (Duursma 2014: 84). Since the 
duration of a conflict increases the possibility of a military stalemate, the expectations for a 
victorious outcome will decline on both sides. Assuming that continuation of combat is not 
the preferred outcome of the disputing parties, the willingness to find alternatives to the 
fighting will increase. Therefore, the likelihood of the acceptance of mediation will increase 
when the conflict is complex and long and when there a no victorious outcome for either party 
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foreseeable (Greig and Regan 2008: 766; Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 17).    
 Greig and Regan further find that the likelihood of disputants rejecting mediation is 
higher in the initial and final phases of conflict. As mentioned before, in the early stages of a 
conflict, disputants believe that they can be victorious. However, in the final stage of the 
conflict, the (financial) costs will have risen. Additional social-psychological pressures of 
retribution might become apparent. Furthermore, the sunk costs might have risen to such an 
extent that only victory can be an acceptable outcome (Greig and Regan 2008: 767).  
 Another factor that will motivate conflicting parties to agree to start mediation is when 
they are in a situation of ‘mutual hurting stalemate’(MHS). When disputants are in a situation 
of MHS, they feel that they are locked in a costly conflict from which they cannot victoriously 
escape. William Zartman used MHS as an indicator in his ripeness theory. According to 
Zartman a conflict is ready or ‘ripe’ to start de-escalation strategies when the disputing parties 
are in MHS (Aggestam 2005). In other words, when the disputing parties’ costs of continuing 
the conflict become greater than the costs of peace, a conflict is ripe. However, MHS is not 
the only way to conceptualise a ripe moment. In a situation of ‘mutually enticing opportunity’ 
(MEO) - which underscore the future gains and not the costs - a ripe moment to start 
mediation can also be theorized to arise. In MEO, parties agree to mediation since they expect 
to realise certain goals. A ripe moment can thus be characterised as a moment in which 
disputants either have a prospective view (focus on gains) or a retrospective view (focus on 
costs avoidance) (Aggestam 2005).   
 
Acceptance of the mediator          
Mediators will sooner be accepted by the disputing parties if they have confidence in the 
ability of the mediator to reach their preferred outcome. However, if the stakes in the conflict 
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are high, the likelihood that mediation will be refused will increase. After all, disputants do 
not want to be restricted to certain outcomes and will therefore be less flexible to accept 
mediation (Duursma 2014). 
 The reputation of the potential third-party mediator is also of significance in the 
acceptance of mediation. The reputation of a mediator is known by his prior experience and as 
his track record in mediation efforts. Mediators who have successfully mediated conflicts will 
build a reputation. This reputation will increase the willingness of disputing parties to accept 
the respective mediator as their mediator. Moreover, the involvement and acquaintance of a 
mediator in a conflict will increase the trust disputing parties have in a mediator. The 
mediator has to be trustworthy, impartial and work towards a successful outcome. The 
trustworthiness of a mediator will increase the acceptance of future outcomes (Greig and 
Regan 2008: 768).           
 Another factor that might influence disputants to accept third-party mediation is the 
expected benefit parties can generate. A mediator can bring experience and expertise to the 
table. In addition, a mediator can potentially overcome a deadlock situation. Disputing parties 
can compare potential outcomes of mediation with the alternative. The alternative being either 
a continuation or a definite ending of the conflict. Depending on the conflict both alternatives 
can be frustrating for the disputants. Additionally, a third-party might agree to take on the role 
of mediator to benefit its own interests (e.g. money, prestige or reputation building) (Wall, 
Stark et al. 2001: 373).          
 Not only the trustworthiness of the mediator, but also the existence of mutual trust 
between the disputants is needed in order to start mediation. Kelman (2005) argues that 
despite a mutual interest in a peaceful outcome, parties can be reluctant to trust to each other. 
In order to start mediation, mutual trust needs to be present. Yet, since disputants distrust each 
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other, how are they able to build a relationship of mutual trust if they will not even enter the 
mediation process to begin with (Kelman 2005: 641)?     
 Kelman argues that the external third party mediator can have a decisive role in the 
creation of mutual trust. Since the mediator can serve as a repository of trust, it can overcome 
the gap between the disputants. Disputants might not be able to trust each other, yet they can 
trust the setting in which interaction will ensue. The mediator can create a setting where the 
interests of the disputing parties are protected and in which their confidentiality will be 
respected. Moreover disputants need to know that they will not be exploited nor that their 
participation will be used against them (Kelman 2005: 645). The trustworthiness of the 
mediator can therefore enforce the mutual trust between the disputants.    
 
Devious objectives 
Taking the above arguments into account, a necessary precondition to start mediation is the 
perceived necessity of disputants that a negotiated outcome is preferred to a continuation of 
the conflict. Yet other reasons can be put forward to answer the question as to why mediation 
is accepted. Several 'devious objectives'  can also be of an influence. First, belligerents and 
rebel groups might gain recognition if they accept meditation. After all, they would have to be 
accepted as an official party and thus, governments indirectly recognise and legitimate the 
negotiation position of the rebel group.       
 Second, mediation can be used as a stalling tactic, while negotiation processes ensue 
the disputing parties each get time to reorganise. This might generate a stronger position if  
combat were to start again in case mediation were not to result in a peaceful outcome 
(Richmond 1998: 714; Duursma 2014: 84). Other 'devious objectives' to start mediation can 
be to gain international support (internationalisation), the search for an ally and face saving 
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(Richmond 1998: 712).  Therefore, a theoretical argument can be made why mediation can be 
accepted, despite the disputing parties having no desire for a peaceful outcome.  
 
From third-party to mediator                       
Scholars also discuss the reasons for a third party to become a mediator in a conflict. A 
mediator might have public and private interest to take on this role. Public interests can 
include a more balanced and stable international environment and therefore decrease the 
negative consequences of an armed conflict (Duursma 2014: 85). Private interests could 
include a decrease of negative consequences that directly impact the mediating party. 
Reducing the spill-over effects of a conflict (refugee inflows, trade disruptions) can act as a 
prime incentive to start mediation. In addition, private mediation can also be of a more 
humanitarian conduct since intergovernmental organisations and nongovernmental 
organisations view peace as a goal in itself (Duursma 2014: 85).     
 States adjacent to states in conflict are significantly 14 times more likely to offer 
mediation than to a state at an average distance of 2035 kilometres. Other factors that will 
increase the likelihood of a third party offering mediation are the existence of a shared 
defence pact; common historical linkages such as colonial ties or a linkage with the Catholic 
Church (Greig and Regan 2008: 773).  
        
A prepared mediator  
Most studies focus on the question why a mediator decides to mediate, yet the question 
whether a mediator is ready to take on the role of mediator is a scarcely researched. The 
readiness of a mediator (carried out by either a governmental, intergovernmental or 
nongovernmental actors) can be measured using several dimensions: (1) operationally and 
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politically ready; (2) strategically and diplomatically ready and (3) having the right 
relationships to be the right mediator (Crocker 2003: 152).     
 First, operational and political readiness for mediation is indicated by the preparedness 
of the mediator to start a  peace making process with all necessary personal and institutional 
power to be the main lead channel during the negotiations. Therefore operational readiness 
can encompasses several variables the mediator needs such as the necessary leadership to 
make an impact; a solid and durable mandate; staff support and other bureaucratic resources 
(Crocker 2003: 153-155).          
 Strategic readiness is the second requirement needed for a mediator. Mediation efforts 
which are tied to strategies of political engagement strengthen the mediation process. When a 
genuine commitment is made to a policy of regional peace making, stronger political support 
can be also be given to mediation. This can be of particular interest if early attempts have 
failed and a conflict has become deadlocked. In such a situation, it will be apparent that 
walking away from the conflict will threaten the general goals of a regional policy (Crocker 
2003: 157-158).            
 The third requirement to indicate the mediator’s readiness is the 'relationship readiness 
and connectivity'. In order to resolve a conflict the appropriate mediator has to be there. The 
mediator's identity, cultural and historical linkages and the overall relationship with the 
disputants, can make a mediator 'a good fit' to mediate between the disputants. In some 
conflicts, mediating institutions or individuals have devoted years in order to grow in the role 
of the 'natural' mediator (Crocker 2003: 160).   
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2.2 Conducting mediation: strategies and approaches 
Based on the consent and the acceptance of the disputing parties, a mediator can start the 
actual mediation process. Mediators are not always passive onlookers, on the contrary, they 
can be active participants in the negotiations. The style, the strategies and approaches the 
mediator takes on can have a profound and decisive result on the outcome of mediation. 
Mediation can take on several forms, these forms will be further discussed in the following 
section.    
 
Mediation intervention strategies                       
Mediation intervention strategies can range from low to high. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) 
distinguish three strategies along a low-high intervention sequence: (1) communication 
facilitation, (2) procedural strategies and (3) directive strategies (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006: 
338).           
 Communication facilitation strategies (also known as the consultation model) are 
adopted by a mediator when he has a passive role. The mediator conveys information between 
the disputants and facilitates cooperation. The mediator displays little control over the 
substance of the meditation. Norway's role in the Oslo agreement between Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is an example of communication facilitation 
(Bercovitch and Gartner 2006: 339).        
 By way of using procedural strategies a mediator takes on formal control over the 
mediation environment. The mediator can dictate the structural facets of the meetings, the 
communication process and control media publicity. However, the most powerful strategies 
are the directive strategies. Using these strategies, the mediator can affect the content of the 
bargaining process. The mediator can provide certain incentives to the disputants to ensure 
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that they negotiate. Furthermore, the mediator can issue ultimatums to the disputants 
(Bercovitch and Gartner 2006: 339).       
 Communication facilitation strategies appear to be among the most frequently used 
strategies. However, communication facilitation strategies perform the worst when compared 
to the other strategies. The directive strategy is more successful in high-intensity conflicts 
than in less intense conflicts. Whereas procedural strategies are more effective in less intense 
conflicts than in high-intensity conflicts. So to say, any mediation intervention seems to be 
helpful in a conflict, the extent to how far mediators should go in depends on the intensity of 
the conflict (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006: 348).  
Good offices and shuttle diplomacy 
Several other forms of mediation can be further distinguished such as good offices and shuttle 
diplomacy. According to Bercovitch and Fretter, good offices is a “passive form of mediation 
and is often described as a diplomatic method of conflict management”. The mediator in this 
strategy acts as a coordinator and does not persuade the disputing parties to reach a resolution 
(Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 22). The concept of “good offices” originates from the Hague 
Conventions in 1899 and 1907. It describes the (political) role of the Secretary-General during 
conflict management. Good offices is not codified in the UN Charter, yet over time it has 
been developed by several Secretaries-General as a high-profile mediation instrument, 
intended to prevent intra- and interstate conflicts (Franck 1995: 361).  
 The mediator merely offers a channel of communication and arranges meeting places 
and facilities were parties can hold their talks. Therefore, by behaving like a facilitator and 
being passive in the actual negotiations, the mediator tries to promote a resolution (Bercovitch 
and Fretter 2004: 23). In a later stage of the negotiations, good offices often grows into a 
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broader mediation role: conciliation. Conciliation involves the more active role of a third-
party during the negotiations. The experiences of the mediator have been found to have a 
significant influence to come to a successful resolution (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 23; 
Fisher and Keashly 1991: 35). Experience is not the only determinant for successful 
resolution but other attributes such as expertise, flexibility, knowledge, personality, 
favourable background of the mediator, impartiality and interpersonal skills have been found 
to be significant in mediation as well (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 23).    
 Shuttle diplomacy (also known as mediation caucusing) is another mediation strategy 
where the mediator mainly relays information between the disputing parties. The mediator 
separately meets with the disputing parties. Organisational representatives have seen mixed 
successes when using this strategy. Since over the course of a conflict the representatives of 
disputing parties can change, the dynamics between the mediator and disputants keep 
changing as well (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 23).      
 The concept of 'shuttle diplomacy' was first mentioned after the Yom Kippur War 
(1973) when former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tried to negotiate peace in the 
Middle East; Kissinger was 'shuttling' between the disputing parties. Therefore, shuttle 
diplomacy is mostly used in situations where the mediator has to travel long distances in order 
to meet with the parties. Yet shuttle diplomacy is also applicable in situations where the 
disputing parties are in close proximity, but refuse to formally acknowledge the other party or 
meet face-to-face (Hoffmann 2011: 268).    
 
Potential obstacles  
During meditation, mediators have to establish a zone where a possible agreement can exist. 
In order to do that, they have to overcome possible obstructions that might interfere with an 
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agreement. One of these obstacles can be the distress of the disputing parties’ fear of mutual 
exploitation (Hoffmann 2011: 279). At the same time mediators need to deal with the 'adverse 
selection' problem which is caused by parties not disclosing all the information. Hoffmann 
describes adverse selection as a 'product of informational asymmetry and can result in 
contracts advantaging the party keeping hidden information (2011: 272). Mediators can 
resolve the adverse selection problem by sharing the information they gathered during the 
negotiations. Naturally, conflicting parties would no longer trust and share information with 
the mediator if they know all information is shared. As such, the mediator has to adopt a 
compromising strategy called 'noisy translation of private communication' with all the 
disputing parties: the mediator is imprecise with the information gathered and does not 
explicitly state what the other parties want (Hoffmann 2011: 273).    
 Additionally, a mediator can help to deal with the various negotiating problems such 
as unrealistic expectations, emotional barriers and fear of losing face. Also, the shuttle 
diplomacy strategy ensures that the mediator can develop a better understanding of the issues 
at stake and create a better understanding of the interests and needs of disputing parties 
(Hoffmann 2011: 276-280). Using shuttle diplomacy as a mediation strategy might sometimes 
be the only workable strategy in order to come to a resolution.  However this form has also 
come under some controversy as shuttle diplomacy can give the mediator too much power 
and knowledge (at the expense of the disputing parties). In contrast, joint sessions can 
increase understanding the opposing views of the disputing parties (Hoffmann 2011: 263).  
 
A successful strategy 
For mediation strategies to be successful the timing of intervention is seen as essential. 
Usually, regional organisations can make a better judgment when to start mediation since they 
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are in a better position due to logistically smaller travel obstructions. Overall, both good 
offices and shuttle diplomacy can be implemented swiftly and thus can prevent a total 
disruption in the dialogue between the disputing parties (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 24). 
Moreover, the role of third parties in mediation is more than just arranging an environment for 
the mediation process. Additionally, mediators need to allow disputing parties their freedom, 
informality, privacy and neutrality to conduct a dialogue (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 24). 
 Which mediation strategy is chosen in a conflict is dependent on the nature of the 
relationship between the disputants. The style of mediation is adapted to the situation of the 
conflict, a more intense and violent conflict will need a more intense intervention. Since the 
costs of failed mediation are higher in those conflicts, a mediator will use any 'stick and 
carrot' in its reach to increase the chances of an agreement. Yet, one also has to take into 
account that due to intensity of the conflict, the best result that can be achieved could be a 
hiatus of the violence. If the same 'stick and carrots' were to be used in a low-sensitive conflict, 
the measurement might be taken into account as too dominant, and thereby in the end, be less 
effective (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006: 339). 
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2.3 Mediation outcomes 
The mediation efforts and strategies that are undertaken are being pursued with the objective 
to come to an agreement. The outcome of mediation are here divided in two categories 
namely the durability and the quality of the peace agreements. 
Durability of an outcome                               
Beardsley (2008) researched the possibility of lasting peace as a result of mediation. The 
short- and long-term effects of mediation are quite diverse. The short term outcomes lead to 
satisfying outcomes for all disputants. Yet, in the long run, when the mediator's influence 
subsides, the settled agreements become outdated. Demands of the disputants are likely to 
change over time, and an achieved agreement can become less durable than an agreements 
made without a mediator (Beardsely 2008: 737).       
 The likelihood that a peaceful agreement will last, will decrease over time. However  
this does not mean that mediation cannot be worthwhile since mediation can reduce the 
chances of an immediate violence outbreak of a conflict. The peaceful agreement mediation 
can have could last for years. Furthermore, agreements based on mediation in which 
leveraging the costs and the promise of monitoring are used will not be stable. Those more 
forceful mediation strategies can lead to final agreements which differ from the military 
reality on the ground. This unstable situation brings forward the uncertainty that one party 
will not hold on to the agreement as soon as it believes it can gain more (Werner and Yuen 
2005: 261; Beardsley 2008: 737; Duursma 2014: 92).     
 Whether mediation can lead to a lasting peace is undecided. Agreements in which 
there was no to little mediation are seemingly more stable in the long run. Since mediators try 
to refrain disputants from using violence as well as solving the controversy between 
20 
 
disputants, mediation ought to focus on solving these two aspects of the conflict. Using 
manipulative strategies can lead to the establishment of an agreement. If a mediator where to 
use facilitation strategies at the same time, it could establish a more durable agreement 
(Duursma 2014: 92).  
Quality of an outcome                                              
The second aspect is the quality of the outcome of mediation. A conflict often revolves 
around issues concerning the control over territory, control over the government of a state or 
both. Svensson (2009) finds that mediators who have a stronger incentive to reach an outcome 
to the conflict often do this at the expense of the quality of the outcome. These so-called 
'neutral mediators', do not support either side in the conflict. The motives of neutral mediators 
to get involved in a conflict can differ; humanitarian or altruistic motives might be the leading 
causes. Other consideration could stem from the protection of the mediator's reputation. Since 
these mediators are neutral, they have no interest in any particular outcome.   
 However, they do want the conflict to be resolved sooner than later, since they have to 
also bare costs (Svensson 2009: 448). On the other hand, biased mediators have an interest in 
one of the disputants. They will seek to find an outcome in which 'their' parties' interests are 
protected. Moreover, biased mediators can have a special relationship with one of the 
disputants such as a historical connection or as a material supplier of goods. Therefore, they 
might push 'their' side to take on costly concessions in order to come to an outcome. 
Mediators will decide to take this action when one of the sides has to take on costly 
concessions. These costly concessions might endanger the future peace of the agreement. In 
addition, neutral mediators can decide to push 'their' side to take on a part of the costs 
(Svensson 2009: 448).     
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 Accordingly, these biased mediation efforts are found to be more successful and 
lasting than neutral mediation. Biased mediation enables the development of a more 
elaborated institutional system which is  more contributory to a durable peaceful outcome and 
democracy. In neutral mediation the likelihood is higher that outcomes will be accepted 
without any agreements on (political or territorial) power sharing, security guarantees, 
promises of reinstatement and dispensation for belligerents (Svensson 2009: 461-462).  
 Arguably, the bargaining position of a biased mediator is better due to their special 
relationship with one of the disputants. Three reasons can be found why the quality of neutral 
mediation is lower in comparison to biased mediation. First, neutral mediators have costs 
during the mediation process t therefore hey will hasten the process. Second, due to the 
inability of neutral mediators to put pressure or leverage on the disputing parties they will 
settle for any outcome. Third, neutral mediators have fewer capabilities to bring about an 
agreement and disputants will rather ask biased mediators to lead the negotiations (Svensson 
2009: 449). 
2.3.3. Conclusion                         
All in all, for mediation to come about at all, disputing parties have to be willing to start the 
mediation process and to seek assistance of a mediator. Due to the voluntary aspect of 
mediation, a third-party must be willing to mediate and as such also has to be accepted by the 
disputants as the mediator. Additionally, disputants are more likely to accept mediation when 
they acknowledge that there is more to gain then to lose in mediation. Mediation is not only a 
cost-effective strategy, it can also be usefully applied together with peacekeeping efforts. The 
United Nations (UN) often combines peacekeeping missions and mediation (Bercovitch and 
Fretter 2004: 17). A mediator can adopt several mediation strategies such as communication 
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facilitation, procedural strategies, directive strategies, good offices and shuttle diplomacy. For 
a strategy to be successful, the timing when a mediators intervenes can be essential. During 
mediation, the mediator has to be aware of potential obstacles. A fear that disputants might 
mutually exploit each other can exist. In addition, the adverse selection problem might arise; 
disputants can decide to not share all information in the process. This problem can be solved 
by sharing information during negotiations. The capacity for the mediator to use 'sticks and 
carrots' can increase  use the chances of an agreement.      
 Finally, the outcome of mediation can be divided in durable and quality peace 
agreements. Additionally, a distinction between 'neutral' and 'biased' mediations can be 
distinguished. Biased mediators have a special relationship with one or both of the disputants. 
In comparison with neutral mediation, biased mediation is often found to result in a successful 
and lasting outcome.  
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3. Research Design 
The case 
Scholars have written on several issues concerning the mediation role of third parties within 
conflict management. Some of these concepts are the mediators' influence on the duration of a 
conflict; the role of a transnational or regional third party and the several mediation 
techniques third parties adopt in order to peacefully resolve. 
This thesis will provide a full in-depth analysis of the conflict in Myanmar and the role of the 
UN in this conflict between 1990 and 2013. This timeframe is chosen since Myanmar 
attracted international attention after the 1990 elections. At the time, the NLD won the 
elections with a landslide victory. However, the the regime ignored the election results and 
arrested members of the opposition.         
  In addition, the main focus of the analysis will be on the role of the UN as the 
mediator in the conflict and which mediation strategies the UN used. Bercovitch stated that 
“UN mediations are less likely to succeed than mediation by states or regional organisations”. 
This can be explained partially by the states’ distrust of international organisations and their 
preference for managing conflicts bilaterally or with mediators of their own choosing” 
(Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 31). The thesis will discuss Bercovitch's assertion and its 
applicability to the Myanmar case.  
 
Research question  
The main research question addressed in this thesis is: To what extent has the UN mediation 
effort been effective in Myanmar between 1990 and 2013. The research question will be 
answered by answering the sub-question: which mediation strategies have been used by the 
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UN envoys assigned to Myanmar?  
Effectiveness is measured in terms of the extent to which the actions of the UN mediation 
meet the expectations of the disputants and the expectations of the UN member states.  
 
Method of analysis 
The study aims at gathering knowledge (descriptions and explanations) about the case, UN 
mediation in Myanmar. This descriptive approach uses a single case study to research on how 
the situation was in the past or will be in the present. In this case study we focus on UN 
mediation in Myanmar over the time period of 1990-2013.  
 
Data collection 
Due to the language differences and geographical distance, the prospect to collect original 
data is unlikely. Furthermore, the research will consist of the necessary literary work written 
about mediation in Myanmar. These will encompasses reports of the UN, NGO's, news 
reports and policy reports of various organisations.  Seeing that the UN mediation processes 
have been extensively documented and that UN has been the main mediator in the conflict, 
most attention will be given to this role. However, the role of other mediating actors will also 
be described in the final part of the thesis. A variety of other primary and secondary sources 
are used as well, to establish a complete picture of the conflict situation in Burma. 
 
Relevance 
Since the end of the Cold War, influencing and managing internal conflict within states has 
become increasingly important. Several national and multinational (successful) attempts have 
been undertaken by various third actor parties to resolve intrastate conflicts (Regan 2002: 55). 
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Intrastate conflicts are challenging the international security, in order to stabilise these 
conflicts scholars have developed ample strategies to bring conflicts to a peaceful resolution 
(Carment and Rowlands 1998: 572). When a state is embroiled in a conflict it can find a 
peaceful solution in two ways: either initiate (open or secrete) bilateral negotiations or procure 
the support of a third-party as a mediator (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004:14).   
 This research is of political-societal relevance since it describes the UN mediation 
process in one of its member states. The UN is a supranational organisations with seemingly 
limitless authority. Nonetheless, since 1995 the UN has sent four envoys to Myanmar. The 
current UN envoy however was only able to use his UN mandate effectively after economic 
sanctions were dismantled by key member states. Key members states can have a big impact 
on the efficiency of an envoy, which might undermine the mandate given by the General 
Assembly. Moreover, it was for the first time that the UN sent out the good offices role to 
mediate between a state and an individual which that state regarded as a dissident.   
In addition, lessons learned from the UN envoy in Myanmar can be used by other mediators 
to make informed decisions. Therefore, it could be beneficiary to prevent and resolve other 
conflict.  
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3. The case: Myanmar 
3.1 The start of UN mediation in Myanmar 
In January 1949 the Karen tribal group led a revolt which turned into a civil war. The fighting 
and ethnic conflict continued with no side achieving a conclusive victory. The conflict 
occurred not only within Burmese borders; in 1969 Chinese soldiers fought with Burmese 
troops on Burmese territory. Furthermore, Karen rebels were very much active along the Thai 
border (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004: 191). Despite the continuing conflict, very few attempts 
(especially by external mediators) were  made to manage the conflict (Bercovitch and Fretter 
2004: 167). Chaim Kauffman speculated in his research in 1996 that 'ethnically based 
conflicts are harder to resolve than other forms of civil war' (Regan 2002: 57). This could 
have been one of the reasons as to why there have been few attempts to mediate in the 
Burmese ethnic conflict.     
 Since 1990 the UN started to show some involvement in Myanmar. This interest arose 
after the Burmese regime annulled the 1990 election results in which the National League of 
Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, had won with a landslide victory. However, 
Aung San Suu Kyi was at the time already placed under house arrest by the military regime in 
1989. Aung San Suu Kyi was internationally regarded as the winner of the elections and when  
her story become more widely known, her struggle to establish a democratic country 'freedom 
from fear' received worldwide attention (Kyi 1992: 5).                        
 The UN recognises in their Article 33 of the UN Charter several conflict management 
strategies: “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (UN Charter, chapter 
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VI).             
 Western and regional countries were hesitant to interfere in the county's internal affairs 
and looked at the UN's Secretary-General's good offices to lead the negotiations in Myanmar 
(Magnusson and Pedersen 2004: 2). Between 1991 and 1992 the Swedish Under Secretary-
General  Jan Eliasson visited Myanmar on several occasions (Lewis 1992). With his 
assistance the General Assembly accepted the first resolution on Myanmar on 17 December 
1991. The resolution was meant as a reminder for the Myanmar regime to establish a 
democratic state, and urged the regime to “allow all citizens to participate freely in the 
political process in accordance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” (UN General Assembly 1991).        
 A year later, Francesco Vendrell was appointed as director of the UN's Asia and 
Pacific Division. Vendrell felt a stronger commitment to Myanmar, and especially towards 
the democratic case of Aung San Suu Kyi. However, within the UN it had been found to be  
highly unlikely that the General Assembly were to appoint a special representative in a good 
offices role and be sent to Myanmar (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 8).   
  In the history of the UN, never before was a good offices role sent out to mediate 
between a state and someone that state perceived as a dissident. UN member states that felt 
strongly towards the non-interference principle were not willing to give their support to such a 
mandate. Further, the Myanmar regime would not easily accept the good offices role in 
Myanmar. With the guidance of Eliasson and Vendrell, several Western member states agreed 
to carefully phrase a Myanmar resolution during the 85th plenary meeting in 1993. They put a 
sentence in the resolution which created opportunities for the a broader mandate but would 
not raise questions. Number 15 in  the Myanmar resolution stated: “Requests the Secretary-
General to assist in the implementation of the present resolution and to report to the General 
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Assembly at its forty-ninth session” (UN General Assembly 1993: 4). 
 As such, the UN General Assembly requested the assistance for the implementation of 
its annual resolutions on Myanmar in 1993. The subsequent mandate implied several political 
reforms with the purpose to end the ethnic conflict and issues related to human rights, 
socioeconomic and humanitarianism. However, in reality the UN was only focused on 
promoting democracy in Myanmar. As a biased mediator, the UN was focused on establishing  
a dialogue between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi and restoring political freedom 
(Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 83).       
 As a result of the resolution, the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali laid 
out a plan to initiate UN involvement in Myanmar. By early 1994, the Pakistani Rafeeuddin 
Ahmed was sent out as the first representative of the Secretary-General to Myanmar. 
Rafeeuddin was never an official envoy for Myanmar, but was asked to deliver a letter from 
the Secretary-General to the military regime in Myanmar. In the letter Boutros-Ghali asked 
for the establishment of a dialogue between the regime and the UN: “The main objective of 
such dialogue would be to exchange views on the various issues of common concern and to 
consider how the United Nations can assist in facilitating continued progress towards the 
resolution of these issues. I sincerely hope that Your Excellencys Government is agreeable to 
this quiet approach” (UN General Assembly 1994).      
 Boutros-Ghali started his mediation effort at a low-intervention sequence as he offered 
to help with facilitating the process, more powerful strategies could have intimidated the 
regime and refuse mediation. The Myanmar regime response: “I have also noted with deep 
respect the desire you conveyed […] to establish dialogue with the Government of the Union 
of Myanmar to exchange views on the various issues with a view to  considering how the 
United Nations can assist in facilitating continued progress towards the resolution of these 
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issues. I hope to communicate with Your Excellency on this subject in the near future […] 
(UN General Assembly 1994). As such, Rafeeuddin paved the way for the first official 
Myanmar envoy, led by the Peruvian Alvaro de Soto (then Assistant Secretary-General for 
Political Affairs (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 9-10).    
 As Hoffmann (2011) noted, a mediator has to find common ground on which a 
possible agreement can exist. Since the situation in Myanmar garnered more international 
media attention, the UN was seen as the ideal mediator to intervene. As such, the UN had 
both public and private interests to become the mediator. The letter from Boutros Boutros-
Ghali was the first step to find common ground. 
    
1.2 The first envoy - Alvara de Soto (1995-1999) 
The first official UN envoy, Alvara de Soto, made six visits to Myanmar during his time as 
envoy. In 1995 formal mediation efforts of the UN started, negotiations ensued between the 
Karen rebels and the military regime, yet no agreement was established. In September 1994, 
for the first time since Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest, she met with the 
regime's General Than Shwe and Intelligence Chief Brigadier General Khin Nyunt.  
Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 13). 
  Alvaro de Soto had plenty of experience when he started his role as mediator in 
Myanmar. He had previously worked as a successful mediator in conflicts in Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and El Salvador. De Soto's experiences and expertise made him a trustworthy 
mediator. However, during previous mediations de Soto had the support of the UN and its 
member states, the same could not be said when he went to Myanmar (Magnusson and 
Pedersen 2012: 14).           
 De Soto first visits to the country were mainly intended to create more personal 
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relations on the ground. At the time it was known within the UN that even if the envoy would 
be unable to come to an outcome, at least they would have tried (Magnusson and Pedersen 
2012: 15). In interviews with Magnusson and Pedersen, de Soto made it clear that these visits 
to Myanmar felt like “visits to the dentists”. The visits were part of the requirements of a 
mediator to build a relationship of trust between the disputants and the envoy.  General Than 
Shwe did not receive de Soto at any time during these first missions; instead de Soto held his 
meetings with Khin Nyunt (SLORC secretary-1, the Intelligence Chief) and Aung Toe 
(chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, Chief Justice). During these visits de Soto 
noted that there was much suspicion and distrust between the Burmese generals.  
 Shortly after de Soto's second visit, Aung Sun Suu Kyi was released from her house 
arrest on the 10th of July 1995. She was given the same limited rights as the other citizens had 
in Myanmar (Silverstein 1996: 212). However, de Soto's second visit and the release of Aung 
Sun Suu Kyi were merely coincidental. Nonetheless, in August de Soto hoped that the 
situation had improved and tried to get the military regime and Aung Sun Suu Kyi to continue 
the talks. The SLORC refused to do so, stating that they regarded Aung Sun Suu Kyi as 
merely an ordinary citizen.  De Soto did not return to Myanmar in that year (Magnusson and 
Pedersen 2012: 17).  
 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed in a letter to the to Senior General 
Than Shwe, Chairman of the SLORC another visit from the envoy to Myanmar in early 
September. Boutros-Ghali wanted de Soto to meet with the authorities and other relevant 
political personalities in Myanmar. The regime was willing to meet de Soto but “it could not 
agree to private meetings with all the personalities” (UN General Assembly 1996).    
 The UN tried to improve the good offices with the formation of a so called 'Group of 
Friends', officially titled the Informal Consultation Mechanism for Myanmar (ICMM). The 
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group consisted of several countries who desired a peaceful outcome to the conflict (Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, Thailand, the UK and the US). There were no 
sympathisers of the military regime; also India and China were left out. During the meetings 
of the ICMM the US and the UK pressed for extra pressure on Myanmar from the Asian 
countries (Magnusson and Pedersen 2014: 17).       
 In 1997, de Soto visited Myanmar for the third time. Kofi Annan had been appointed 
as the new Secretary-General of the UN and US president Bill Clinton had announced a ban 
on all US investments in Myanmar. With this step Clinton instantly put more international 
pressure on Myanmar. De Soto was appointed as a special envoy of the Secretary-General but 
his new title had little practical influence. Additionally, the UN did not have all the necessary 
information available and as such they were unable to make an informed and updated analysis 
of the conflict at the time.    
 In 1997 peace negotiations once again failed to establish an agreement which led to 
renewed fights between the SLORC and the Karen National Unity (KNU). In response to the 
'severe repression' of the political opposition, the US enforced economic sanctions against 
Myanmar. A year later, 1998, the UN tried a new strategy; instead of pressure and threats, de 
Soto wanted to introduce more positive incentives for the military regime. The envoy also 
looked at the possibilities to resolve the underlying ethnic problems in the region. However, 
the regime was especially sensitive towards the ethnic problems and viewed it as an internal 
issue.             
 Consequently, the positive incentive de Soto wanted to create was economic 
development for Myanmar with the help of the World Bank (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 
20). De Soto hoped that a positive incentive for the regime would encourage them to start 
negotiations again.  The World Bank estimated the Official Development Assistance (ODA)  
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at $1 billion. Yet, before the deal could even be offered to the Myanmar regime, a journalist 
from the New York Times caught wind of the deal - which was about to be submitted to 
Myanmar - and headlined the story: “$1 Billion if Generals Will Talk with the Opposition” 
(Crampton 1998).  A Yangon-based diplomat was cited in the article “A lot of sticks have 
been used — and they remain in place — but now we are also offering the government some 
carrots.” The Myanmar regime felt humiliated by this action and despite a worsening 
economic situation the regime refused the financial stimulas. Foreign minister Win Aung 
stated: “This is like offering a banana to a monkey and asking it to dance. We are not 
monkeys. We won't dance” (Mitton 2000).  
 Not only the Burmese regime was reluctant to accept UN help, Aung San Suu Kyi 
made her own preconditions clear to Washington. She demanded the release of all political 
prisoners before any 'carrots' were to be given, Washington adopted this viewpoint. With this 
move, the envoy was  unable to adjust to any of the regime's interest. De Soto had a hard time 
finding support for any Myanmar-strategy within the UN and the US. By December 1998, 
Washington had not changed their foreign policy view towards Myanmar. In contrast, Aung 
San Suu Kyi had softened her demands but the US did not want to soften its policies towards 
the military regime (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 26).  
 De Soto's intended visit to Myanmar in mid-September 1999 was indefinitely 
postponed by the regime. De Soto had intended to use the visit to unlock the political 
stalemate. Upon hearing of the postponement of de Soto's visit, the UN again considered to 
use World Bank aid to encourage the military regime to engage in talks (CNN 2000).  
Washington eventually aligned their viewpoint with Aung San Suu Kyi three months later, 
which made it possible for the World Bank to accompany the envoy to Myanmar and discuss 
an aid program. A month later, de Soto did travel for his fifth visit to Myanmar, once again in 
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an attempt to start negotiations between the disputants and in return the UN and the World 
Banks would provide for  financial aid (CNN 2000). However, both the SPDC and Aung San 
Suu Kyi had retreated on the idea of brokering a deal. For the first time in years, the SPDC 
and the opposition seemed to have created common ground to start negotiations. However, 
due to the US economic sanctions, the UN was unable to assist the disputants. The UN envoy 
lacked the necessary political and operational readiness. The respective institutional power 
and a solid mandate were absent (Crocker 2003: 153). 
  At the end of this first envoy, Alvaro de Soto was criticised for being indifferent and 
unsympathetic. His mediation attempts between the regime strategist Lieutenant-general Khin 
Nuynt and Aung San Suu Kyi led to no improvements between the two parties. The efficiency 
of de Soto's visits were questionable, however one also had to take into account that de Soto 
could not dedicate all of his time on the conflict in Myanmar.  At the end of his envoy, de 
Soto himself noted that he was deeply pessimistic about a possible peaceful outcome in 
Myanmar. He sketched the situation in Myanmar as being not ripe for mediation (Magnusson 
and Pedersen 2012: 27). Indeed, despite the duration of the conflict in Myanmar, the 
disputants are in a MHS. The costs for the disputants to continue the conflict are lower than 
the costs of peace (Aggestam 2005).        
 As the first official UN envoy, de Soto adopted a facilitation strategy, yet whether any 
side in Myanmar regarded the UN strategy as beneficiary to the process is doubtful. From the 
start the good offices had focused on establishing democratic engagement in Myanmar.       
Since the UN focused primarily on promoting democracy in Myanmar, the economic and 
humanitarian cooperation with the World Bank was purely an incentive for the regime to start 
political reform.           
 Moreover, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi become a focal point during the meetings 
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between the envoy and the regime. As such, the regime perceived the envoy chosing the side 
of the opposition. Due to the financial restrictions imposed on the Myanmar by several 
Western states, de Soto had nothing to offer the regime. Therefore, de Soto tried to engage the 
regime by creating financial incentives. However, Aung San Suu Kyi showed no interest in 
cooperating with the regime and since the US unconditionally supported Aung San Suu Kyi, 
they did not support de Soto's idea to create financial incentives for the regime in 1998. 
Furthermore, Myanmar was not a high priority on the agenda of the US, therefore the US had 
no direct incentive to push for peaceful solution in Myanmar. These aspects taken together 
severely limited the prospects of the first envoy.        
 According to Greig and Regan (2008) the mediator's involvement and acquaintance in 
a conflict will increase the trust disputants have in the mediator. However in the five years de 
Soto served as an envoy, he visited Myanmar six times. De Soto tried to arrange more visits to  
Myanmar yet the regime was not eager to meet him. Several reasons can explain why the 
military regime was not willing to accept de Soto as an mediator. First of all, The General 
Assembly had repeatedly expressed concern over several issues in Myanmar such as the 
procedures of the National Convention and the withdrawal and subsequent expulsion from the 
Convention of NLD. Due to economic sanctions and the influence of the US, de Soto could 
not offer the military regime financial assistance. He had nothing to offer the regime, 
therefore the regime had no incentive to meet with de Soto.  
  
3.3. The second envoy (2000-2005) 
The new envoy - led by Malaysian Razali Ismail – made its first trip to Yangon in June 2000. 
The change in envoy was well received news in Myanmar. The then foreign minister Win 
Aung commented on Razali's assignment: “I hope as an Asian he will understand more of our 
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program” (CNN 2000). Since Razali originated from the same region, the new envoy fulfilled 
Crocker's third criterion: relationship readiness and connectivity (2003: 160). 
However, the second envoy did ignore for the most part the advice of its predecessor. Shortly 
after Ismail's appointment the new UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, 
Brazilian Sergio Pinheiro, was also appointed (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 31).       
 In 2000 talks started between the SPDC and the NLD. These 'secret' talks were 
mediated by Razali. The choice for Razali Ismail as the new representative was a strategic one 
since Razali was from the region and had already met with the Senior General Than Shwe on 
several occasions. Razili's objectives were crystal clear: free Aung San Suu Kyi and establish 
a dialogue between her and the SLORC. How these objectives were to be achieved was 
unclear as a coherent UN strategy was not drafted (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 33). 
 Along the way Razali stipulated his own strategy; first he would stop the Westerns 
antics of 'pressure politics' and encourage Myanmar to look and learn from their neighbours. 
Second, Razili put the importance of reconciliation of the ethnic minorities on the agenda. He 
was the only one of the four envoys who put an emphasis on the ethnic debate and as such 
extended the agenda of the good offices. Third, Razali refused to simply follow Aung San Suu 
Kyi's righteous position, and urged the opposition leader to change her position to a more 
pragmatic stance. Razali seemed to be especially successful on this third point (Magnusson 
and Pedersen 2012: 34).          
 Razali chose his native Malaysia as the location of his office and he also chose his 
own assistant. By doing this, Razali not only distanced himself from the UN bureaucracies but 
also from the international pro-democracy protests and he moved the issue away from the 
attention of international media (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 34). This all led to Razali 
having more space than his predecessor to plan his mediation efforts. Razali's mediation 
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efforts was further strengthened by the presence of Leon de Riedmatten, a Swiss with 
previous negotiation experience in Myanmar. De Riedmatten had successfully negotiated the 
Red Cross' access to Burmese prisons. Razali received on his visits to Myanmar a warm 
welcome, something that sceptical observers viewed as an attempt of the regime in trying to 
get more support from the Asians. The meetings with the leaders of the SPDC were similar to 
de Soto's, yet with the help of de Riedmatten, Razali was able to schedule his own 
appointments with people he seemed to be of strategic importance (Magnusson and Pedersen 
2012: 35).           
 Additionally, Razali was able to use shuttle mediation in his first years as envoy. 
Razali could meet both Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC twice during his visits; in his first 
rounds he would meet with the SPDC and later with Aung San Suu Kyi. During the second 
round of his visit to Myanmar he would see the government again and afterwards meet Aung 
San Suu Kyi. Razali softened the confrontational tone of the previous envoy as he put less 
emphasis on human rights and more on the opportunity for Myanmar to learn from its 
neighbouring countries (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 36; Bercovitch and Fretter 2004). 
 As mentioned before, Razali was the only envoy who considered the ethnic minorities 
as a  part of the conflict. Razali's envoy held on a regular basis meetings with several ethnic 
minorities where he urged them to take a common position in case a tripartite dialogue could 
ensue.  Yet, the start of a tripartite dialogue was unlikely since the relationship between the 
NLD and the SPDC deteriorated further with the extension of Aung San Suu Kyi's house 
arrest in August 2000.         
 However, the situation did not deteriorate as much as it might have been expected. 
Upon Razali's second visit in October 2000 he was assured by Khin Nyunt that Aung San Suu 
Kyi's house arrest was only a provisional measure and that it would be lifted eventually. Aung 
37 
 
San Suu Kyi seemed prepared to compromise with the SPDC and secret talks between the two 
parties started for the first time since 1994. In order to show goodwill, the regime released 
several political prisoners and the NLD was allowed to open party offices around the country 
again. In 2002 Aung San Suu Kyi was no longer placed under house arrest. However it 
remains unclear to what extent the good offices had any influence as  Razali himself was not 
present during these talks. What is more, the talks were even held in secrecy, without the 
knowledge of the UN.  Razali later commented that he had a role as 'a facilitator, not a 
mediator' (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 37-38).       
 Despite many other complications, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi was a success for 
the UN. However a year later Aung San Suu Kyi would be detained again. This is however 
not surprising since mediation outcomes in which costs are used as leverage are not stable. 
Moreover, the military regime controlled the country and could arrest Aung San Suu Kyi 
again anytime they wanted. Razali had the idea to create a humanitarian council in which both 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC could discuss humanitarian issues. Through the council, 
Razali was optimistic that he could bring the regime and the NLD together, build confidence 
and trust between the two parties whilst at the same time establishing a way to help the 
Burmese citizens out of their dire situation (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 39). As such, 
Razali tried to use the humanitarian council as 'carrot'.  
 In 2001 Razali had already mentioned the prospect of a humanitarian council to both 
Khin Nyunt and Aung San Suu Kyi; they dismissed the idea immediately. Yet, due to the 
Asian economic crisis  Khin Nyunt was trying to rekindle the relationship with the West. 
Supporting the idea of a humanitarian council would garner more international support. Aung 
San Suu Kyi was invited by the regime to visit several infrastructure projects, which she 
agreed to. Despite these small steps a humanitarian council never was established. Razali later 
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stated that the regime was too distrustful towards Aung San Suu Kyi and there was simply  
not enough support for the idea from the UN Secretariat and the regime (Magnusson and 
Pedersen 2012: 40). Despite his facilitation attempts Razali had been unable to create mutual 
trust between the disputants.       
 In May 2002, Razali continued his facilitating role when he organised a lunch where 
both Aung San Suu Kyi and the regime's three top officials (General Than Shwe, Vice Senior 
General Maung Aye and General Khun Nyunt) were present. As a result, the regime created a 
ministerial team which was assigned to continue talks with Aung San Suu Kyi. Yet Aung San 
Suu Kyi grew impatient with the lack of process and she found it condescending that she was 
not talking with the regime's top officials directly. By November 2002 the negotiations were 
going nowhere and in another attempt to bridge the differences Razali suggested that the 
regime would reassemble the National Convention. Further the NLD was to be invited to 
discuss constitutional changes. To prevent the regime from breaking of the talks Razali 
promised several financial incentives and immunity for human rights violations (Magnusson 
and Pedersen 2012: 41).      
 Khin Nyunt was open to the idea to negotiate with Aung Sun Suu Kyi, yet his superior, 
General Than Shwe, was not so keen. Razali urged Aung Sun Suu Kyi to write a personal 
letter to the General, Aung San Suu Kyi was unresponsive to this idea. The NLD and the 
SPDC were again in a political stalemate. According to Razali, the stalemate was a result of a 
personality conflict between Aung San Suu Kyi and General Than Shwe: “Each one is 
imperious in his own way and neither is ready to compromise” (Wikileaks 2002). General 
Than Shwe failed to respond to any of Razali's suggestions. The General was further angered 
by Razali's plans to visit Aung San Suu Kyi who was at the time visiting the Shan State. 
Razali was instructed by Khin Nyunt that such a visit would endanger the UN's impartial 
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status. (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 41).           
 Aung San Suu Kyi continued her trip throughout Myanmar in order to reorganise and 
encourage the NLD. On May 30 2003, her trip was disrupted by a mob attack on her convoy. 
Aung San Suu Kyi's car was able to escape but an estimated seventy people were killed. 
Following the attack Aung San Suu Kyi was once again arrested and detained. Her renewed 
detainment resulted in international protests, especially in the US where financial sanctions 
were implemented by the Congress. The UN Secretary-General urged Razali to take on an 
active role as facilitator of the negotiation (Wikileaks 2004).     
 Razali's envoy designed two options for the UN; they could either put the Secretary-
General's good offices on hold and wait for the regime to initiate negotiations or the  UN 
could use a 'stick and carrot approach'. The later approach entailed an increased involvement 
of the international community and the international normalisation of Myanmar. Before these 
plans were even brought to the discussion table, the Myanmar regime had already initiated a 
Seven-Point Road Map to Discipline-Flourishing Democracy (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 
43). The seven points described in the roadmap were: “1. Reconvening of the National 
Convention that has been adjourned since 1996; 2. After the successful holding of the 
National Convention, step by step implementation of the process necessary for the emergence 
of a genuine and disciplined democratic state; 3. Drafting of a new constitution in accordance 
with basic principles and detailed basic principle laid down by the National Convention; 4. 
Adoption of the constitution through national referendum; 5. Holding of free and fair 
elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (Legislative bodies) according to the new constitution; 6. 
Convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution 
and 7. Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the 
Hluttaw; and the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw” (Burma Today 
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News: 2004). In the years following this roadmap several points were boycotted by the 
opposition (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 43-44).   
 During his visits (in June and October 2003 and March 2004) to the country, Razali 
continued his efforts to start an engagement between Aung San Suu Kyi and Khin Nyunt.  He 
succeeded to persuade the regime to change Aung San Suu Kyi's detainment from prison to  
house arrest. In July 2004 de Riedmatten and Razali spoke with Kofi Annan to discuss the 
next steps in their strategy. The Secretary-General urged Razali to be more proactive and be 
less responsive to events controlled by the SPDC in Myanmar. Moreover, the military regime 
was in a political stalemate again and according to Riedmatten the generals were 'very 
comfortable with the status quo and not feeling any particular international pressure' 
(Wikileaks 2004).    
 In the fall of 2004 several moderates  in the Myanmar regime (including Khin Nyunt) 
were purged and the entire military network was dismantled. From this moment on Razali was 
also no longer allowed to attend and influence future events. In March 2004 he made his final 
visit to Myanmar. In the following two years no other UN senior official would be able visit 
the country (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 46). During the next fourteen months since Khin 
Nyunt's purge, Razali continued his attempts to influence the international community to 
pursue  cooperation with Senior General Than Shwe. In the end he was unable to do so and 
Razali,  frustrated with the lack of progress  resigned in January 2006 (Rieffel 2010: 19; UN 
News Centre 2006).  
 During his time as envoy Razali Ismail encountered the same problems de Soto had: 
the lack of support from the UN member states. Due to the economic restrictions Razali had 
nothing to offer to the regime. Razali also tried specifically to garner support with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, but they were also not willing to 
41 
 
support Razali's idea. The UN envoy was unable to unite the international community behind 
his mission. The UN envoy was also unable to convince key member states to use economic 
sanctions against Myanmar in correspondence with the UN missions.    
 Since this did not succeed, Razali tried to start a humanitarian engagement with both 
the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi. With several moderates present in the military regime, the 
regime showed concessions. They released several political prisoners and started a drug 
eradication program. However, the international community did not recognise the concessions 
the regime was making. Therefore, by the time Aung San Suu Kyi was willing to cooperate 
with the regime in 2004, the regime had already purged the moderate members of the regime 
and no deal was made. In hindsight Razali was right in his assessment that the NLD had to 
find some way to work together with the regime if change were to come about at all.  
 According to Crocker's requirements, Razali  has been the most 'prepared' mediator. 
Razali showed operational readiness by appointing his own staff and setting up his office in 
Malaysia. Moreover, Razali showed political readiness since he had de Riedmatten on the 
ground in Yangon which opened doors that were previously closed. However, the UN had not 
drafted a clear strategy, a durable mandate lacked once again.     
 Razali however had stipulated his own strategy. First, he wanted to put a hold on the 
Western  pressure politics and encourage Myanmar to look and learn from their neighbours. 
Second, Razili wanted to put reconciliation of the ethnic minorities on the agenda. Razali was 
unsuccessful in both regards. Razali was more successful with the third part of his strategy: he 
urged Aung San Suu Kyi to change her position to a more pragmatic stance. Progress was 
made between Aung San Suu Kyi and Khin Nyunt, yet General Than Shwe hindered any 
concrete progress.  
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3.4.The third envoy (2006-2009) 
The Nigerian scholar and diplomat, Ibrahim Gambari, was appointed as the new Secretary-
General's Special Advisor for the third envoy (UN News Centre 2007). After Razali's failed 
efforts, expectations were extremely low and the UN adopted a passive attitude towards 
Myanmar. At the time of his appointment Gambari also held the rank of UN Under-Secretary-
General for Political Affairs. Therefore, the regime held Gambari in a higher regard since 
previous envoys had held lower ranks (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 51).  
 Gambari adopted a different work style and did not reject the regime's roadmap it had 
outlined in 2003. Instead he emphasised from the start his desire to make the process all-
encompassing. Gambari had to start from scratch, he therefore chose to use a low-intervention 
strategy since he passively communicated with the military regime. These quiet talks the 
envoy held with the General Than Shwe were ultimately successful. In May 2006 – after more 
than two years – the UN envoy was finally allowed to visit Myanmar again (Magnusson and 
Pedersen 2012: 53). The visit was perceived as a success since Gambari visited the regime's 
elite and Aung San Suu Kyi. Moreover, both parties conceded that the UN had a role to play 
in the process. During a press conference Gambari stated “They want to open up another 
chapter of relationship with the international community” (The World Post  2010). For the 
first time in the history of the UN envoys in Myanmar both disputants announced that they 
accepted the UN envoy as a mediator. Gambari's appointment was regarded by the regime as 
a new opportunity since he did not dismiss the regime's roadmap immediately. Gambari 
continued to focus on re-establishing trust between the UN envoy and the disputants.     
 However, three days after Gambari's visit, the regime once again prolonged Aung Sun 
Suu Kyi's house arrest. Six months later Gambari visited Myanmar again, similar to his first 
visit, he was able to convene with both General Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi. As a 
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gesture of goodwill, the regime had released several imprisoned NLD members. Whether this 
gesture had anything to do with Gambari's envoy is uncertain. In the same time period the 
Myanmar regime received increased attention from the UN Security Council.   
 In August and September 2006 the situation in Myanmar deteriorated after the regime 
crushed protests in which an estimated thirty people were killed. The international community 
severely condemned the actions taken by the Myanmar regime. With help from the Chinese – 
who ensured the visa - Gambari was able to visit the country again for the first time in nearly 
a year. During his visit Gambari spoke with General Than Shwe and twice with Aung San 
Suu Kyi. General Than Shwe made several concessions; Aung San Suu Kyi was permitted to 
talk to senior party officials, the regime started talks with the UN humanitarian liaison again 
and political prisoners were allowed visits from their families. For the first time, Aung San 
Suu Kyi declared she saw a positive development in her country (Magnusson and Pedersen 
2012: 58). 
 Moreover, in September of the same year, the situation in Myanmar was put on the 
agenda of the Security Council. The UK and the US perceived Myanmar as a 'threat to 
international peace and security'. As a result international lobby groups demanded a Security 
Council resolution on Myanmar. To the regime's relief a draft-resolution was double-vetoed 
by China and Russia in January 2007 (UN Security Council 2007). The double-veto was 
perceived by the regime as a diplomatic victory. However, with the resolution Western 
diplomatic efforts pushed the regime too far and the prospect of slow engagement (and long 
term results) were put on hold (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 55).  
 While relations between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi seemed to improve, the 
relationship between the regime and the UN deteriorated further. Charles Petrie (UN Resident 
and Humanitarian Coordinator) was expelled from Myanmar in October 2007. Furthermore, 
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Gambari's proposal to start a dialogue between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi, led by the 
UN was refused. In the eyes of the SPCD, the UN envoy was too closely connected to several  
superpowers and had failed to prevent new economic sanctions by the US, the EU and 
Australia (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 58-59).       
 In addition, Gambari had read a statement written by Aung San Suu Kyi during a press 
conference in Singapore. In the statement Aung San Suu Kyi wrote that she was 'ready to 
cooperate' (NBC 2007). Gambari felt he could not decline to read it, since otherwise it would 
have created friction with the NLD (and several Western governments). However, the regime 
perceived it as a violation of their trust in the envoy and regarded Gambari as a liaison for 
Aung San Suu Kyi. Additionally General Than Shwe was also frustrated with Gambari for the 
way he used the Chinese to get a visa, for holding his press conferences after his visit not in 
Myanmar and they accused Gambari of selective reporting (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 
59). Gambari’s reputation was damaged and the prospect of an breakthrough diminished 
likewise. Despite the regime's frustrations Gambari continued to work as envoy and he 
assembled a 'Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar' which was set out to 
establish  international consensus for a constructive approach for the good offices. The group 
consisted of Australia, Indonesia, the US, Russia, Japan, Singapore, China, India, Vietnam, 
France, Norway, Thailand, Portugal and the UK. Especially the involvement of China was 
found to be of substantive help for Gambari. With the exception of the US, the involvement of 
the other ‘friends’ seems exaggerated and counterproductive since it could lead to Myanmar 
being over pressured and misunderstood. Yet at the same time, the regime once again 
questioned Gambari's role as impartial advisor due to his talks with other nations in March 
2008 (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 60; USA Today 2008). 
 On May 2 2008, Myanmar found itself again in the international spotlight when the 
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category-four cyclone Nargis devastated the country and severely affected 1.5 million people. 
According to official numbers 140,000 people died, other sources stated that the death toll 
was an estimated 200,000. However, the Myanmar regime refused international assistance 
and prevented international aid workers from entering the country. This led to an intensified 
protests in the international community (Telegraph 2008). 
 Tensions decreased after the ASEAN established a Humanitarian Task Force which  
facilitated foreign aid. Furthermore, Ban Ki-moon personally spoke with General Than Shwe 
to assure him that international aid was purely meant as humanitarian aid. To emphasise that 
politics were not involved Gambari did not accompany Ban Ki-moon. Aside from the 
ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force, a Tripartite Core Group (TCG) was founded. The TCG 
consisted of representatives from the UN, the Myanmar regime and ASEAN, and continued to 
play a humanitarian role after Nargis (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 63).  
 The TCG established a diplomatic opening on which Gambari had waited for a long 
time. As a last resort option, Gambari wanted to see whether humanitarian cooperation would 
lead to confidence building and cooperation in other fields. Gambari returned to Myanmar in 
August 2008, with him he brought a personal letter from Ban Ki-moon and a five-point 
agenda from the Group of Friends. The points called for: 1. release of political prisoners 
including Aung San Suu Kyi; 2. dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi; 3. a credible political 
process; 4. addressing socio-economic issues including the idea of an economic forum and 5. 
regularisation of the Good Offices role (including some regular representation on the ground) 
(Security Council Report 2008; Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 65).  
 This time Gambari tried to take on the role of mediator between Aung San Suu Kyi 
and the regime, and between the international community and the regime. The regime was not 
interested and tried to persuade the envoy that the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi were no 
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longer held in high regard with the populace (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 65). Moreover, 
Aung San Suu Kyi tried to send a message to the regime and refused to meet with Gambari. 
Two UN staff-members tried to persuade Aung San Suu Kyi to meet Gambari anyway. They 
stood outside her house with her megaphone shouting: 'Mr Gambari wants to meet you' (The 
Age 2008). Additionally, the NLD scolded Gambari for his praise towards the TCG: 'We feel 
that he [Gambari] is trying to appease the junta so much that he is being derailed off his main 
track' (Mizzima News 2008).  
 Both the regime and the main opposition party no longer held any confidence in 
Gambari and the good offices of the UN. As a result the US concluded that it could no longer 
support an UN envoy led by Gambari. However, this did not stop Ban Ki-moon from 
personally pursuing a breakthrough in talks between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi. 
Despite the disappointing previous eighth visit from Gambari to the country in June, Ban Ki-
moon decided to visit Myanmar in July 2009. Ban Ki-moon met General Than Shwe twice, 
but was denied seeing Aung San Suu Kyi. Ban Ki-moon farewell speech contained numerous 
references to the lack of human rights in Myanmar, much to the dismay of the regime. The 
relationship between the UN good offices and Myanmar had deteriorated even further 
(Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 68-69).   
 This however did not mean that the relationship with the UN was completely shattered, 
on the contrary, the UN Under-Secretary-General and executive secretary of the UN 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Noeleen Heyzer, was 
received with open arms in Myanmar. Heyzer spoke with Prime Minister Thein Sein and 
several ministers but she also talked with ordinary civilians during her visit through the 
country. Heyzer's approach was well received in Myanmar and in July 2009, Minister Htay 
Oo announced the beginning of a partnership between Myanmar and the ESCAP (Magnusson 
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and Pedersen 2012: 70).    
 In his final report, Gambari formulated the ESCAP successes as if they were part of 
the good offices. Yet it is unlikely that ESCAP and the good offices have influenced each 
other since ESCAP resulted from the TCG initiative. At the start of his envoy, Gambari had 
realised that if mediation were to lead to some outcome, previous strategies had to be 
drastically altered. Consequently, Gambari changed the agenda, tried to persuade UN member 
states to use 'carrots' to let the regime enter mediation. Using a new approach – the three-pillar 
approach – Gambari tried to incorporate a political, humanitarian and a development agenda. 
 However by creating this three-pillar approach, each particular approach did not 
receive full attention and development. Therefore, the humanitarian and development agenda 
could not have grown to their full potential. Yet in hindsight Gambari was right to establish a 
three-pillar approach since a humanitarian initiative had created an opening for the mediation 
process. Futhermore, Gambari did not want to dismiss the roadmap the Government had 
created since ignoring the roadmap would have distorted the relationship with the 
Government. 
 
3.5. The fourth and current envoy (2010-....) 
Despite the strained relationship between the UN and the regime, the UN member states were 
not willing to implement a hiatus in the efforts of the good offices. Ban Ki-moon's chief of 
staff, the Indian diplomat Vijay Nambiar, was appointed as the new envoy. Nambiar was the 
former Indian ambassador to China and established during that time a good relationship with 
Beijing (Buenos Aires Herald 2010). To what extent Nambiar used his good connections with 
China – viewed as an important ally to the regime – is unknown. However, the network, 
experience and expertise Nambiar had built during his diplomatic career reinforced his role as 
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UN envoy. (United Nations 2014).          
 The international community was still very much involved in the political affairs in 
Myanmar. On the one hand, the US had - aside from maintaining the already existing 
sanctions – decided to initiate direct involvement in Myanmar by sending a senior US official. 
On the other hand, China and the ASEAN had decided to support the roadmap set out by the 
Myanmar regime. It was during the complementation of the fifth point (multiparty elections) 
of the roadmap, that Nambiar was invited to the country. At the same time, the envoy 
maintained connections with member states, international financial institutions and local civil 
society. Furthermore, the UN stressed their willingness to support Myanmar with technical 
assistance during the elections in order to ensure fair elections (Magnusson and Pedersen 
2012: 75).            
 During talks with India, China and Singapore it was clarified to Nambiar that they had 
a strong preference for the UN to continue its three-pillar strategy in order to ensure stability 
in Myanmar. The regime in Myanmar was at the time solely focusing on the upcoming 
elections in November 2010. The regime was determined that no actor such as the UN or the 
NLD (which boycotted the elections) would distort the elections. Consequently, the 
government party - the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won the elections 
with an overwhelming majority. Shortly after the elections results, the government released 
Aung San Suu Kyi after spending seven and a half years under house arrest (Magnusson and 
Pedersen 2012: 77).           
 In November 2010, during Nambiar’s first visit to Myanmar and a few weeks after the 
first elections, Nambiar focused on furthering the democratisation process to the best of his 
abilities. As such, Nambiar could not tolerate neglecting parties (e.g. ethnic minorities and the 
NLD) which had not participated in the elections. As mentioned before, Nambiar focused on 
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the three-pillar strategy and emphasised that the UN was committed to support Myanmar in 
those areas. Nambiar chose to meet with all the respective ministers in the political, 
humanitarian and development areas. However, the regime's military top generals were not 
willing to meet with Nambiar. The strained relationship between the UN and the regime had 
not improved and ignoring Nambiar was a clear sign that the regime had no wish to cooperate 
with the UN (Buenos Aires Herald 2010).        
 Nonetheless the UN envoy was able to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi and several civil 
society organisations without the direct supervision of the regime. Aung San Suu Kyi had 
realised that working together with civil society groups would be beneficiary for both sides 
(UN News Centre 2013). Aung San Suu Kyi remained suspicious of the UN and demanded 
more support from the UN for her case: “the UN should do more to express concern over 
developments and that she [Aung San Suu Kyi] expected to have frequent interaction with the 
UN through a more active good offices, preferably with a full-time special envoy” 
(Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 77).        
 In addition Aung San Suu Kyi called the 2010 elections “illegal” and “a parody of 
democracy”. Nambiar later described his response to Aung San Suu Kyi: “At that stage, for 
various reasons, I mentioned to her that while I agreed with her, it was important to probably 
look at this new development in a slightly different manner and perhaps to help in moving 
that progress towards democracy. She said at that time that she had just come out of detention 
and there was a need for her to look at how things were developing inside the country.” In 
hindsight Nambiar was right to suggest to Aung San Suu Kyi to support the quasi-civilian 
government, despite its undemocratic character. Nambiar's suggestion ensured that the regime 
saw goodwill on the side of the opposition.        
 After his first visit as UN envoy to Myanmar, Nambiar concluded that the deadlock 
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between the NLD and the regime could be interrupted by the introduction of civil societies. 
Several civil society groups would concentrate on critical issues they viewed most important, 
but they would do their work within the constitutional framework designed by the regime. By 
trying to find common ground, Nambiar tried to save the good offices' reputation as a honest 
and reliable mediator. Additionally, Nambiar saw opportunities for the UN to engage in 
socioeconomic areas since ethnic parties were keen for more assistance. At the same time, 
several ministers in the regime asked for the annulation of restrictions on the UNDP's 
mandate (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 78). Nambiar could use this situation to find room 
for more UN engagement in Myanmar       
 In February 2011, the newly elected president Thein Sein (and the first civilian head of 
state) caught the international community by surprise when he announced his new reform 
agenda. Included in this agenda were national reconciliation measures, economic reform, 
poverty reduction and anti-corruption regulations (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 78). In 
May 2011, Nambiar visited Myanmar again, yet due to protocol issues he was not able to 
meet the new president.          
 Despite the new changes in Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi remained suspicious of the 
reforms President Thein Sein was planning to implement since the government still 
maintained complete control. Yet to Nambiar's assessment, there was no way to negotiate 
around the government's control since the explicit approval of the government was necessary 
if the political process were to make any progress. Additionally, from the perspective of the 
government, they had already showed enough commitment. Making more concessions to 
please Aung San Suu Kyi was not an option (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 79). 
 Eventually, Aung San Suu Kyi became convinced of the sincerity of the regime's 
reforms when President Thein Sein publicly stated that the 1990 elections results were 
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historical valid. This statement coincided with the Nambiar's third visit to Myanmar. After a 
meeting with president Thein Sein, Aung San Suu Kyi agreed to work with the government 
towards democracy, despite retaining a number of reservations about the army and the 
structure of the  government (UN News Centre 2013).     
 After the 2010 elections the Myanmar government initiated a democratisation process. 
The government claimed that this process was a result of the seven-point roadmap, yet 
interestingly enough Nambiar links the democratisation process to the release of Aung San 
Suu Kyi and her subsequent decision to support the democratisation process (UN News 
Centre 2013). New laws were designed which allowed the NLD to re-register as a political 
party in November 2011. Regardless of all the good news, Nambiar naturally continued his 
efforts to enlist Myanmar in new engagements. In September 2011 he facilitated a meeting 
between  several Myanmar ministers and member states (the US, China, Russia, Australia and 
six ASEAN countries). The meeting, designed to build trust and confidence between the 
parties and to familiarise the Myanmar government with the outside world, was held in the 
offices of the Asia Foundation in New York. The idea of the meeting had twice before been 
declined by the Myanmar government. The meeting was perceived as successful since two 
days later, the Myanmar delegation continued bilateral negotiations with US officials 
(Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 81).       
 Nambiar again visited Myanmar in November 2011 and February 2012, and during the 
by-elections in April 2012 the Myanmar government invited the UN  to observe the elections. 
The UN sent a political team which included a staff member of Nambiar's office. In the 
ensuing by-elections (in which 10 percent of the parliamentary seats became available) in 
April 2012, the NLD secured a majority of the votes and the political team assessed the 
elections positively. As a result, Aung San Suu Kyi became a member of Parliament in May 
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2012 (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 79-80). The international community welcomed the 
reforms in Myanmar and member states stopped most of the implemented sanctions. Within 
the next six months, both the foreign ministers of Australia (Kevin Rudd) and the US (Hillary 
Clinton) visited Myanmar (The Australian 2011; Lee Meyers 2011). Accordingly, Ban Ki-
moon visited Myanmar for the third time in April 2012. During his visit he clarified the desire 
to normalise international relations with Myanmar and he assured the government that the UN 
would support them: “I welcome Myanmar’s desire for guidance and advice from the United 
Nations and other multilateral institutions” (United Nations 2012).   
 Nambiar, made his sixth visit to Myanmar in June 2012 during which he made more 
promises to the government to help with transitional challenges. As such, the role of Nambiar 
had changed since he mainly acted as facilitator in the process of democratisation. Since the 
international restrictions implement against Myanmar had been dismantled, the UN envoy 
was able to work freely – without any restrictions – in Myanmar. Despite several problems 
and obstacles, Nambiar believes that the work of the UN became better understood and 
accepted (UN News Centre 2013).          
 In 2013, Nambiar put forward three priorities for the UN. In the first place the UN 
should guide Myanmar in facilitating the democratisation process: in terms of electoral 
processes and procedures; an office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has to be set 
up in Myanmar and in 2014 the government will conduct a population census in which the 
UN's help will be vital. Second, the UN can consult between ethnic groups and the central 
government, the experiences the UN has can be helpful in the reconciliation process. Finally, 
the UN can play a fundamental role on the development side. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) are some of the agencies that are actively aiding the government already (UN 
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News Centre 2013).          
 However, since the Government started its nationwide reforms, violence has up surged 
throughout the state. Since June 2012 several clashes between Buddhists and Rohingya (the 
Muslim minority) occurred in the state Rahkine; 200 people died and thousands fled the 
region. In the states Kachin and Shan fights ensued between the army and ethnic groups 
(Rijksoverheid 2014; BBC 2014). Nambiar called on the Government to punish those 
responsible for the violence and further promised that the UN would provide assistance to 
rebuild the region (CBC News 2013).        
 On the 26th of September 2013, the Secretary-General convened a meeting of the 
'Group of Friends' on Myanmar to discuss recent developments in the country. For the first 
time, Myanmar itself was present at one of these meetings, the other members of the Group 
praised Myanmar for the democratisation processes, national development and reconciliation. 
However, the Group not only complimented Myanmar, but also urged the country to find the 
underlying causes of violence and continue its development.     
 During this meeting Ban Ki-moon remarked: “But there is still much to be done to 
ensure accountability for the perpetrators and restitution for those who have suffered. The 
fears, vulnerabilities and suspicions of the minority community have yet to be fully alleviated, 
[...]. I also hope that the positive engagement between the Myanmar authorities and armed 
ethnic groups will result in a nationwide ceasefire very soon. [..]. In this broad context, the 
United Nations will stand ready to continue scaling up its support activities to the 
Government and all key stakeholders as requested” (UN Secretary General 2013).   
 Nambiar continued the three-pillar strategy his predecessor Gambari had established  
in his role as envoy in Myanmar. Yet, due to constitutional reforms in Myanmar, Nambiar had 
more freedom to pursue objectives then his the previous envoys ever had. Not only were the 
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restrictions by UN member states lifted, Nambiar also had more freedom to organise his 
program during his visits (Magnusson and Pedersen 2012: 77).                    
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Conclusion 
The Secretary-General’s mandate from 1993 can be traced back to an request made by the 
General Assembly. The mandate entails several issues, from political reform to 
socioeconomic and humanitarian issues. However the UN has always focused on two 
objectives in Myanmar: to promote democracy and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Four 
different UN envoys have attempted to achieve the goals set by the UN. First of all, Alvaro de 
Soto (1995-1999); Razali Ismail (2000-2005); Ibrahim Gambari (2006-2009) and Vijay 
Nambiar (2010- ). These four envoys have nearly made forty visits in total to Myanmar yet 
have reached  little success. The UN envoys were unable to offer the military regime anything 
of interest since key UN member states adopted economic sanctions against Myanmar.  
 This thesis addressed the research question: to what extent has the UN mediation 
effort been effective in Myanmar between 1990 and 2013? To answer this main question 
another sub-question will be answered: which mediation strategies have been used by the UN 
envoys assigned to Myanmar? The UN envoys have made a difference in the Myanmar 
conflict. However economic sanctions by UN member states against Myanmar have restricted 
the envoys during the mediation process. These restrictions have limited the prospects of an 
agreement between the regime and the opposition for a long time. The limitations due to 
economic sanctions restricted the movements of the envoys. Each envoy adopted a passive 
mediation strategy: good offices. Here the mediator acts as a coordinator and does not try to 
persuade the disputants to come to an agreement. Since each envoy started from scratch, they 
had to start initial talks with each disputing party for them to even consider coming to the 
mediation table. When this first step had been accomplished, the envoy took on the additional 
role of facilitator; arranging meeting places and offering to be a channel of communication. 
These so-called communication facilitation strategies were useful due to their low 
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intervention sequence. The mediator merely offers a channel of communication and arranges 
meeting places and facilities were parties can hold their talks. Therefore, by being passive in 
the actual negotiations, the mediator tries to promote a resolution.    
 The distrust between the military regime and the NLD often resulted in the accusation 
of impartiality of the envoy. Impartiality, personality and interpersonal skills were important 
determinants for the UN envoys. The second envoy, Razali Ismail, used shuttle mediation in 
his first years as envoy. Razali would meet in his first rounds with the SPDC and later with 
Aung San Suu Kyi. During the second round of his visit to Myanmar he would see the 
government again and afterwards meet Aung San Suu Kyi. Also, Razali was the only UN 
envoy who changed the agenda of the good offices. Since he considered ethnic minorities as a  
part of the conflict he held on a regular basis meetings with several ethnic minorities. During 
these meetings he urged them to take a common position in case a tripartite dialogue could 
ensue. Additionally, during his envoy Razali created promising opportunities for 
reconciliation. Arguably, Razali’s mediating efforts have impacted the Myanmar regime to 
such an extent that they wanted to improve their international reputation.       
 Bercovitch’s assertion that “UN mediations are less likely to succeed than mediation 
by states or regional organisations” is partly applicable to the Myanmar case. Yet Bercovitch 
explanation that it is due to “the states’ distrust of international organisations and their 
preference for managing conflicts bilaterally or with mediators of their own choosing” has 
also proven partially true. Due to the restrictions the UN had during the good offices efforts it 
was unable to have any real impact.        
 However one should not neglect the fact that the UN envoys were among the first 
international actors to engage with Myanmar officials and the NLD. They have played an 
important role in pulling Myanmar out of isolation. They developed a strong understanding of 
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the opportunities in Myanmar. Western policies which impacted Myanmar were formulated 
by normative perceptions instead of an empirical views based on facts. Moreover, the UN 
envoy succeeded to establish a dialogue with the military regime on humanitarian issues and 
democracy.             
 The UN is not the only actor who has launched peace making initiatives in Myanmar. 
Other international bodies, superpowers and friendly countries have tried to mediate in the 
conflict (Rieffel 2010: 63). The United States mediation efforts have been unsuccessful. On 
several occasions China has hosted and provided logistical support during the mediation 
efforts between the US and Myanmar. China's role in the ethnic conflict is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, China upholds a policy of non-interference. Yet, on the other hand, China is 
uncomfortable with the Burmese regime being unable to uphold domestic stability (Rieffel 
2010: 63). Other international actors such as the European Union have tried to resolve the 
conflict.            
 The EU appointed Italian diplomat (Piero Fassino) as a special envoy for Myanmar. 
However, after his appointment Fassino has not been issued a visa to enter the country and 
was thus unable to facilitate mediations. The ASEAN has stayed for the most part out of the 
mediation processes. In 2008 the ASEAN initiated a humanitarian mission together with the 
UN, after the cyclone Nargis hit the country and devastated the rice crops and fish industry 
initiated (Rieffel 2010: 65). In exchange for humanitarian changes the regime received aid, 
the initial optimism changed after the regime quickly resorted back to old antics of corruption 
and human rights violations. As a neighbouring state, Thailand has had an interesting role in 
the peace making conflict. Myanmar and Thailand were once imperial rivals and fought 
several wars. To this day the military elites in both countries still distrust the other. 
Nonetheless both countries have entangled their economies out of necessity and convenience. 
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Thailand has become a passive mediator in which several successive Thai governments have 
mediated between the KNU and the military regime (Rieffel 2010: 66).  
In 2011, an end came to the military regime in Myanmar. Currently, President Thein 
Sein heads a quasi-civilian government which was installed after the 2010 elections. In 
addition, after spending 15 years under house arrest, opposition leader and Nobel peace prize 
laureate Aung San Suu Kyi was released. She is now a member of Parliament and can freely 
travel abroad. At the moment, Myanmar is a country in transition, the UN has on multiple 
occasions offered its assistance which the Myanmar government has accepted. Further, the 
conflict between the military and the opposition is not officially resolved. The conflict which 
started generations ago is entrenched in the two parties, distrust and caution are evident. Yet 
despite the longitude of the conflict, the disputing parties have never been in a mutual hurting 
stalemate. Therefore, the possibility for compromise might be in the future.    
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